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AN EPISTEMOLOGY OF CONCRETE OTHERS BASED ON THE
TWO-NATURE CHRISTOLOGY FOR SOLIDARITY OF
OTHERS IN THE AGE OF GLOBALIZATION

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Abstract: This article proposes an epistemology of concrete others as a foundation for solidarity of others, which is to protect the vulnerable who are exposed to two kinds of violence: one is violence from the absolutization of otherness, transcendence, difference; the other is from the absolutization of solidarity, immanence, or homogeneity. While the absolutization of solidarity justifies oppression of others, the absolutization of difference enervates resistance of those who are oppressed others. In order to resist against oppression and violence, the oppressed people need to have solidarity with others. To work toward solidarity of others, one should sublimate both the absolutization of solidarity and the absolutization of otherness, since absolutization of each has justified injustice, indifference, and oppression. Sublation of both the absolutization of solidarity (an epistemology of homogeneity) and the absolutization of otherness (an epistemology of difference) leads to a dialectic epistemology: an epistemology of concrete others. An epistemology of concrete others which is based on the two-nature Christology and confirms the hypostatic union between humanity and divinity, transcendence and immanence, and particularity and universality necessitates and suffices for solidarity of others, with which the vulnerable can resist oppression and indifference caused by absolutization of solidarity and difference, respectively.

Key words: Difference, Homogeneity, Solidarity of Others, Concrete Others, Absolutization, Epistemology.

1. Introduction

Globalization overwhelms human beings in many respects. This article is primarily concerned about the negative side of globalization, that is, the economic, political, and cultural exploitation of the poor. In addressing the various forms of exploitation, the solidarity of others is inevitable. In order to work toward solidarity of others, one should sublimate both the absolutization of solidarity and the absolutization of otherness, since absolutization has justified injustice, indifference, and oppression. Sublation of both the absolutization of solidarity (an epistemology of homogeneity) and the absolutization of otherness (an epistemology of difference) leads to a dialectic epistemology: An Epistemology of concrete others. Based on the two-nature Christology, the epistemology of concrete others supports and justifies the solidarity of others.

I will first discuss globalization and its oppressive nature. Based on the oppressive nature of globalization, I argue that the solidarity of others is inevitable. I will then explore the epistemological basis for solidarity of others after I criticize two epistemologies: an epistemology of homogeneity and an epistemology of difference. In criticizing these epistemologies, I will use two examples: the 1994 genocide in Rwanda and the human rights infringement of married women immigrating from the underdeveloped South Asian countries to Korea. I will then argue that the epistemology of concrete others which is based on the two-nature Christology supports the solidarity of others.

2. Solidarity of Others in the Age of Globalization

In the age of globalization we witness “stretched social relations” across nation-state boundaries, “intensification of flows,” increasing interpenetration of the cultural, economic, and political processes, and “the emergence of global infrastructures and networks” (Held 2004, 15-17). These changes in the globalizing world have tremendous impact on people throughout the globe. Globalization has both positive and negative impacts on people. Those who advocate globalization assert an increase of cultural diversity, economic and technological support provided by rich countries to poor countries, and people power in global governance (Held 2004, 95, 154). People power in global governance means governance from below and by experts (Held 2004, 161). Those who criticize globalization cite cultural imperialism, economic devastation of poor countries, and global governance ruled by omnipotent global capital (Held 2004, 56, 61, 98-101; cf. De La Torre 2015, 68-69). Both advocates reveal some truth in their respective assertions. Whether one advocates the positive or the

negative side of globalization, there is at least one consensus: interconnectedness is widening and intensifying.

According to Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, the widened and intensified interconnectedness puts nearly all people in the world under “the networks of capitalist exploitation” (Hardt and Negri 2000, 43). A small number of people control enormous wealth, while a large number of people live in extreme poverty (Rieger and Pui-lan 2012, 11). The globalizing world is a leviathan that controls every facet of human life, including economic, cultural, and political life. Foucauldian biopower, which is the core conception of the society of control, explains this omni-controlling entity like a leviathan (Hardt and Negri 2000, 23-24). That is to say, the omni-controlling entity exerts its biopower throughout the world since it has no territory or boundary including “social relations, bodies, and minds” (Hardt and Negri 2000, 32). According to the concept of Empire, the globalizing world and all facets of human life are under omni-controlling biopower.

Under this omni-controlling biopower, there is increasing economic, political, and cultural exploitation of the poor in the world (cf. Miguez, Rieger and Sung 2009, 12-13). In such a situation in which a widening and intensifying interconnectedness is used to carry out the exploitation, how can we address the exploitation of the poor? Hardt and Negri suggest that we can transform the huge system of injustice through communication, that is, through the widened and intensified interconnectedness, which sustains the system (Hardt and Negri 2000, 61). In particular, Hardt and Negri emphasize the role of immaterial workers, whose work is related to this interconnectedness through the distribution of information. By taking advantage of interconnectedness, we can effectively resist against the vast oppressive system. In this vein, the solidarity of others, has much to contribute to address biopolitical exploitation. Biopolitical exploitation means the economic, political, and cultural exploitation of the poor. Global interconnectedness enables and necessitates the solidarity of others.

There are at least three reasons why solidarity of others is needed in order to work toward liberation and justice in the age of globalization (Min 2004, 72). First, we can acknowledge the oppressive structures of globalization. As Hardt and Negri point out, it is a biopolitical struggle, that is, an economic, political, and cultural struggle against oppression. Without solidarity, one person or one group cannot transform the biopolitically oppressive structure. In order to resist the full-scale oppression, solidarity is inevitable. Second, we are living in an interconnected world. Boundaries are more and more obscured. Fragmentation of different groups facilitates the biopolitical oppression of all different groups. Since biopolitical oppression is effected through interconnectedness, the struggle against biopolitical oppression can be also effected through interconnectedness. Solidarity which is built upon

interconnectedness beyond boundaries is an effective tool to struggle against biopolitical oppression. Third, regardless of our differences, particular issues in the age of globalization affect all people. Increased usage of Bio-oil in rich nation-states, for example, is the cause of famine in underdeveloped countries. Without solidarity between people in rich nation-states and the poor in underdeveloped countries, starvation is unable to be overcome. In a globalizing world, almost all people are related to and responsible for all kinds of injustice and oppression. This is another reason why solidarity is inevitable.

A fuller discussion of the phrase, solidarity of others, will be given later, but an initial explanation of the phrase should be included here. What does solidarity of others mean? In the phrase, “of” is used instead of “with.” When we say, “with others,” it presupposes a subject and puts others in a peripheral place. Thereby, it regards others as an object or at least a passive subject. On the other hand, the phrase, “of others,” emphasizes the subjectivity of “others” in working toward solidarity and denotes the equal responsibility of “others.” Others are not just receivers of outside aid or help but active participants in resistance against oppression and exploitation (Min 2004, 82). In this way, solidarity of others can avoid oppression and injustice within the solidarity. Historically, solidarity and otherness have been separated and respectively absolutized: absolutization of solidarity and absolutization of otherness. Even today, such respective absolutization is prevalent. I will now turn to the absolutization of solidarity and the absolutization of otherness with relation to epistemology.

3. An Epistemology for solidarity of others

Epistemology is the window through which a human being understands others and the world. Through one’s own epistemology, an individual can have a connection with something or somebody other than herself. At least two different epistemologies have dominated the twentieth century: one has put an exclusive emphasis on solidarity (essence, universality, and totality) and the other on otherness (difference, particularity, and individuality). I would call the latter an epistemology of difference and the former an epistemology of homogeneity. An epistemology of difference is based on Derrida’s philosophy of difference which denies unity or essence but affirms difference; whereas an epistemology of homogeneity is based on the modern philosophy which presupposes nature and essence but pays little attention to difference. Historically, an epistemology of difference has emerged to address the huge problem caused by an epistemology of homogeneity, such as the tendency to alienate and demolish others who are different from a given homogeneous group. Although an epistemology of difference has

contributed by protecting others from being oppressed in the name of homogeneity, an epistemology of difference becomes a new stumbling block to address new forms of oppression of others in the age of globalization; its emphasis on difference hampers solidarity of others and its differentiation of signs from reality brings about indifference to oppressive reality. In order to work toward solidarity of others and address oppressive reality, we need a new epistemology. I would call it an epistemology of concrete others which recognizes difference as well as unity, individuality as well as totality, particularity as well as universality, imminence as well as transcendence, and the like. An epistemology of concrete others can find its basis in the Two-nature Christology, which asserts the hypostatic union of humanity and divinity, particularity and universality, and imminence and transcendence.

3.1. An epistemology of homogeneity

An epistemology of homogeneity has been dominant throughout history and it still has a tremendous impact on human life. This epistemology ignores differences among individuals. It has justified the sacrifice of heterogeneous outsiders as well as the sacrifice of individual insiders, in the name of totalities such as a family, a group, a nation-state, a religion, or a truth.

A recent atrocious example caused by an epistemology of homogeneity is the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. The genocide was done in the name of the Hutu tribe. In Rwanda, there are at least three tribes: Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa. It is reported that at least 800,000 Tutsis were killed in 100 days (Barnett 2003, 130-152). Hutus justified the massacre of Tutsis in the name of the Hutu tribe. Even Hutu Christians killed their neighbor Tutsi Christians who had worshipped together, believing that they were purifying themselves as they tried to wipe out Tutsis. Tutsis were killed only because they were not Hutus. Based on an epistemology of homogeneity, differences were not respected but demolished.

Another example of oppression caused by an epistemology of homogeneity is the human rights infringement of marriage migrant women who come from the underdeveloped South Asian countries to Korea. Nowadays Korea has been experiencing a sudden increase of marriage migrant women from underdeveloped South Asian countries such as the Philippines, Vietnam, and Cambodia (Lee 2008, 110-112; Kim 2012, 538-539). Korea has kept the ideology of an ethnically homogeneous nation. With this ideology, Koreans generally ignore foreigners, especially those from underdeveloped countries. Some intermarried Korean husbands treat their wives as subhuman, such as maidservants or simply birth-giving women. In such ways, the marriage migrant women in Korea are ignored and discriminated against only because they have a different ethnicity (Piper and Roces 2003, 90). An epistemology of homogeneity excludes and discriminates against these marriage migrant women.

An epistemology of homogeneity, which has been instrumental in oppressing others, is inadequate in addressing problems of globalization, as I explained. Specifically, an epistemology of homogeneity finds its inadequacy in dealing with the exacerbation of economic inequality and the increase of migration. Exacerbation of economic inequality is a well-known phenomenon of globalization (Piketty 2014, 304-309; Peters 2014, 5). It is evident that poor countries become poorer and rich countries become richer or at least maintain the status quo, since those countries which are powerful and economically advanced will not lose their wealth (Held 2004, 117). That is to say, if poor people in poor countries experience economic deprivation, it is caused by the unjust international economic system which is controlled by the rich nations. If the poor in poor countries want to address their economic deprivation, they have to struggle against the unjust economic system.

An epistemology of homogeneity seems to work in that struggle: it would bring the poor into solidarity, struggling against the unjust economic system. In reality, however, it is not. In such an economic crisis, the economically deprived people depend on an epistemology of homogeneity not in a way of struggling against the unjust economic system as a solidarity of the deprived, but in a way of sacrificing the more deprived, the powerless, and the more alienated. Rwanda is a precise example. In early 1990s, Rwanda experienced economic depression. The economic depression was affected by the unjust international economic system (Rittner, Roth, and Whitworth 2004, 41). Many of the working population could not get jobs. Even young Rwandans became vagrants. In such an economic crisis, Hutu extremists propagated that Tutsis were oppressors and that the extermination of Tutsis was the way to fix the economic problem and its accompanying social problems in Rwanda. Those who were economically marginalized were easily led into buying the ideology of totality (Hutu extremism) and participating in the massacre of Tutsis. When an economic depression comes in the age of globalization, an epistemology of homogeneity is likely to bring about injustice.

How about an epistemology of homogeneity for the Tutsi tribe? Could the solidarity of Tutsis stop the massacre and secure their lives? It is most unlikely that solidarity of Tutsis could prevent or stop the massacre. Tutsis were a minority whereas Hutus were the majority in Rwanda. In such a situation, the isolated solidarity of a minority against the solidarity of the majority will facilitate oppression of the minority. The struggle between isolated groups will result in oppression of one or more groups.

In a globalizing world migration is constantly increasing. It is said that there is not only the movement of capital and commodities but also the movement of people who are in most cases moving from poor countries to wealthier countries (Held 2004, 101). With the movement of people, ethnically heterogeneous people such as Vietnamese women are

relocated to homogeneous societies such as Korea. With an epistemology of homogeneity, the intermarried Korean husbands coerce their wives to assimilate themselves to an unfamiliar culture. The peculiar cultures of the marriage migrant women are to be ignored and eliminated through the process of their assimilation. The process of assimilation is oppressive to marriage migrant women in Korea, since it divests their own identity as a Vietnamese, a Philippine, or a Pakistani. Insisting upon unilateral assimilation to Korean culture is cultural oppression for the marriage migrant women.

What about the solidarity of marriage migrant women in Korea? Can this solidarity address their human rights infringement? It is unlikely that the solidarity of marriage migrant women would address the oppression. Since marriage migrant women cannot speak well in Korean, they have their own ethnic group meetings, in which they can use their mother tongues. Some husbands are reluctant to send their wives to the meetings, believing that their wives learn in the meetings how to attain their objects and how to resist against them. If the husbands feel a sense of crisis, they threaten their wives with divorce or reduction of remittance. As long as the solidarity of marriage migrant women is isolated from their husbands and Korean society, these women are unable to address the oppression. An epistemology of homogeneity is unable to provide the marriage migrant women an adequate way of addressing their oppression; rather, it exacerbates the oppression of the marriage migrant women, justifying their assimilation to the Korean culture.

3.2. An epistemology of difference

There is another epistemology which is diametrically opposed to an epistemology of homogeneity: it is an epistemology of difference. An epistemology of difference is based on Derrida's philosophy of difference. It is more accurate to say that an epistemology of difference refers to the epistemological side of Derrida's philosophy of difference. Derrida, in his philosophy of difference, deconstructs concepts of totality such as identity, unity, universality, community, system, and so on. According to Anselm Min, Derrida's "deconstruction means to differentiate the identical, complicate the simple, contaminate the pure, destabilize the complacent, and to subvert all reigning totalities and systems by subjecting them to the shock of alterity, the demand of the wholly other, the trauma of the unexpected" (Min 2004, 52). Put differently, there are no such things as the identical, the simple, the pure, and the complacent. Any concept denoting totality or unity cannot avoid deconstruction since the ubiquitous presence of the other in the concept disrupts the unity of the concept; there is nothing that identifies itself; rather, any concept in itself has a differentiating other. Only difference itself is recognized and accepted (Dean 1996, 47-74). Absolutization of difference, in this way, forms the basis for an epistemology of difference.

According to an epistemology of difference, only difference has meaning. Can an epistemology which absolutizes difference address such problems as the 1994 genocide in Rwanda or the human rights infringement of marriage migrant women? At first glance, an epistemology of difference seems to be able to address injustice done to Tutsis or marriage migrant women in Korea, since it recognizes and absolutizes difference. In reality, however, an epistemology of difference is unable to address injustice. According to an epistemology of difference, for example, there is no nature of Tutsis in Rwanda or no essence of marriage migrant women in Korea. There are no Tutsis but poor Tutsis, rich Tutsis, middle-class Tutsis, and so on. In addition, subdivisions within divided Tutsis are endless: half-blooded Tutsis, full-blooded Tutsis, and so on. There are no marriage migrant women in Korea but Vietnamese marriage migrant women, Pakistan marriage migrant Women, Philippine marriage migrant Women. As a subdivision, there are marriage migrant women who marry wealthy Korean men, those who marry poor Korean farmers, those who marry poor Korean manual workers, and so on. The subdivisions are endless. An infinite play of differences eviscerates the power and justification of resistance of the oppressed. It enervates the power of the resistance because the infinite play of differences takes much time and it invalidates justification of resistance because it breaks apart the unity of the resisting group, which leads to “the pluralism of dissociated individuals” (Walzer 1997, 100).

It is unrealistic for an epistemology of difference to attempt to deconstruct unity and to absolutize the individual. It is true that lumping individuals into a group is in many cases oppressive to those who are excluded from the group. It is, however, sheer misconception to assert that the deconstruction of totality or unity will bring about liberation and justice. In a real world, what would happen if we requested both the victimizing group and the victimized group to deconstruct their respective unity and totality? Imagine the request for deconstruction of a victimizing group. Would the victimizing group willingly deconstruct themselves? Human history resolutely says, “No.” For victimizers in our day such as the Chinese government which oppresses Tibetans, the Myanmar military authority which suppresses its own people, and the Sudanese government which marginalizes its own people, such a request to deconstruct their own unity, totality, and nationality would not work at all. If we want to deconstruct their unities, we have to be more powerful than those governments. On the contrary, imagine deconstruction of a victimized group. Although the victimized group would resist the deconstruction, victimizers would willingly deconstruct unity and totality of the victimized group, since the diluted identity of the victimized group enfeebles their power to resist against victimizers’ oppression. In this vein, deconstruction of totality and absolutization of difference would be

powerless in promoting justice and liberation; rather, it would worsen the oppression and injustice.

In the case of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, grouping of the Hutu tribe caused the genocide of Tutsis. If there had not been such a tribal grouping, there might not have been such genocide. The genocide might have been avoided if all Rwandan individuals had their own isolated places. With their own isolated places, Rwandan individuals could appreciate others' difference: Hutus could appreciate the differences of Tutsis. In reality, however, they are thrown into a common space and they cannot avoid interaction with one another (Min 2004, 70). If people live in a common space and are unable to avoid interaction with one another, can we avoid grouping? Can we live without totality? We cannot. We can neither avoid grouping nor live without totality.

Individual human beings are destined to resort to transcendence or totality. That is to say, an individual human being is destined to affiliate with something bigger than herself, such as her family, her nation-state, her religion, or her truth. It is because an individual cannot overcome her existential fear, that is, the fact that she is a transient being and fears her death. Paul Tillich dealt with this individual desire to identify oneself with totality. In his book, *The Courage to Be*, he shows that the courage to be means that an individual is able to address the danger of non-being: it is possible not by herself, but by the power which is beyond herself or the state of non-being, since non-being in itself is unable to provide her certainty (Tillich 1952, 156-160). And so, individual human beings search for something beyond their transient being. That is to say, human beings are bound to resort to totality and transcendence. An epistemology of difference, however, attacks unity, totality, and transcendence, as it absolutizes difference, individuality, and imminence. Considering an individual's inclination for belonging to totality or transcendence, an epistemology of difference has a fundamental flaw, since it denies the core inclination of human beings. It is an innate human inclination to belong to totality and resort to transcendence.

In the case of the marriage migrant women in Korea, absolutization of difference enervates their resistance. Most of the marriage migrant women come from underdeveloped South Asian countries. Within the group of the marriage migrant women, there are differences in status and these differences are often detrimental to their ability to organize and resist. As they differentiate themselves from others in the group, internal antagonism arises and it hampers their energy to consolidate the group and their resistance against the structural oppression on the group.

A crucial problem of an epistemology of difference is that it reduces realities to signs: a tangible reality becomes an intangible, insubstantial knowledge (Min 2004, 67). Signs have connections with other signs, but signs have no connection to tangible realities. There could be extensive critical discussion of alternatives to totality and universality in the realm

of signs; however, as long as signs are separated from realities, the critiques of and alternatives to totality and universality are only intellectual amusements, since realities remain unchanged (Min 2004, 68). Semiotic attempts to address problems of totality bring forth sleek solutions; but they work only in the realm of signs totally separated from the actual reality. In this vein, an epistemology of difference resembles Docetism. Docetism teaches that incarnation, the life of Jesus, passion, and crucifixion are all illusions without reality (cf. Guthrie 1994, 237). Like Docetism, an epistemology of difference transforms realities into signs, which are illusions since the signs have no connection to realities. Insofar as an epistemology of difference reduces realities to signs, it remains indifferent to the reality of oppression. An epistemology then reveals its impotence in addressing the reality of oppression.

Within the realm of signs, there is no deficiency. Instead, everything is perfect. Quite opposite to the perfect realm of signs, the realm of reality is filled with deficiency, imperfection, defectiveness, and the like. In the realm of signs justice prevails; but in the realm of realities injustice predominates. That is why Derrida regards determinacy as injustice. The identification of determinacy with injustice evokes Docetism or Gnosticism, from which Docetism was born. Gnosticism presupposes that reality is impure, or even evil. Instead, it regards spirit as pure and good. In this vein, an epistemology of difference resonates with Gnosticism (Min 2004, 85). Insofar as an epistemology of difference identifies determinacy with injustice, it is prone to take reality of oppression for granted.

4.3. An Epistemology of Concrete Others

Both an epistemology of homogeneity and an epistemology of difference fail to promote liberation and justice. An epistemology of homogeneity could assert solidarity only at the expense of difference: it supports solidarity of the same. An epistemology of difference, on the other hand, could secure otherness only at the expense of solidarity: it supports difference without solidarity. We need an alternative epistemology which affirms both unity and difference and supports solidarity of the different. It is a dialectic epistemology, which I call an epistemology of concrete others. It means an epistemology which affirms both essence and difference, and supports solidarity of the different.

The crucial criticism of an epistemology of concrete others is how one can recognize both essence and difference in an epistemological object. It is true that if we focus on difference essence is ignored; if we focus on essence difference is negated. However, essence and difference can be simultaneously recognized if we accept the tension between essence and difference in a given object. It is paradox of reality. This paradoxical reality leads us to regard human beings as concrete others (Kwak 2016, 51-52).

The two-nature Christology provides the basis for the epistemology of concrete others. Two-nature Christology was officially affirmed in the Council of Chalcedon in 451 (Hastings 1999, 70). According to the council, in Jesus Christ, there is the hypostatic union of divinity and humanity, transcendence and determinance, and incomprehensibility and recognizability. Two important expressions on Christology in the council are “without division” and “without confusion.” Humanity and divinity have been united without division as well as without confusion. Humanity and divinity comprise a unity. The expression, “without division,” on the one hand, means that the hypostatic union of humanity and divinity in Jesus Christ exists without separation or distance. The expression, “without confusion,” on the other hand, means that the difference between humanity and divinity in Jesus Christ is preserved. Two-nature Christology shows the tension as well as coexistence between two opposite concepts such as transcendence and determinance, and incomprehensibility and recognizability.

The epistemology of concrete others presupposes both incomprehensibility and recognizability of a given epistemological object. Humanity as an epistemological object, for example, is incomprehensible but recognizable. A human being cannot be fully essentialized since it is incomprehensible. Any attempt to essentialize a human being is thus only an incomplete essentialization. Using essentialization to oppress others, therefore, is impossible in the epistemology of concrete others. The fact that humanity is incomprehensible does not mean that humanity is unrecognizable. Humanity is incomprehensible and at the same time it is recognizable. Humanity has its concrete form and exists as a human being in a real world. If we cannot recognize the concrete form of humanity, we become Gnostics. Unlike Gnostics, we affirm the concrete form of humanity. The recognized, concrete form of humanity, however, is not equated with humanity. To assert that the recognized, concrete form of a human being is equated with humanity is a result of ignoring the incomprehensibility of humanity. In the epistemology of concrete others, both incomprehensibility and recognizability are in an endless tensional process, both challenging and enriching each other.

Solidarity of others is supported by the epistemology of concrete others. The concept, solidarity of others, is a contradictory expression. It consists of solidarity and otherness, which contradict each other. Solidarity has an innate tendency to exclude and alienate others. If we concretize solidarity, otherness will be ignored or even excluded. On the contrary, otherness has an innate tendency to be indifferent to solidarity. If we preserve otherness solidarity will be difficult for us to achieve. Any attempt to concretize solidarity, therefore, should result in a tentative, approximate form of solidarity, which is free from being absolutized and thereby does not abolish otherness (Min 2008, 177-202). The tensional,

dialectic relationship between solidarity and otherness will progress as solidarity and otherness challenge and enrich each other.

How do solidarity and otherness challenge and enrich each other in their tensional, dialectic relationship? First, each challenges the other, preventing each other's absolutization. Any phase of solidarity is not final as any phase of otherness is not definitive. Second, each enriches the other, letting each other elaborate on what to exclude (in light of solidarity) and what to include (in light of otherness). The dialectic relationship of solidarity of others, in this way, will minimize its oppressiveness (on the side of solidarity) and indifference (on the side of otherness).

In light of the dialectic relationship of solidarity of others, marriage migrant women and their husbands are able to commence new solidarity different from former ones. It is solidarity of marriage migrant women and their husbands. The husbands have oppressed their wives and the wives have regarded their husbands as oppressors. In a globalizing world, however, both are under the economic, cultural, and political exploitation. As soon as they notice the vast oppressive structure that thoroughly controls both of them, they can recognize their otherness and accordingly consider solidarity of others. Through the dialectic process of solidarity of others, they endlessly broaden and deepen their understanding of each other.

Nevertheless, the dialectic relationship of solidarity of others is not an endless process; the dialectic relationship between solidarity and otherness converges on the perfection of the relationship as is revealed in the hypostatic union of divinity and humanity in Jesus. The council affirms Jesus as "true God," and "true human" (Gonzalez 1984, 257). "True God" has no ambiguous meaning, but "true human" has two different meanings. On the one hand, "true human" means that Jesus had limitations like us. Jesus did not possess unlimited knowledge; rather, he revealed his limited knowledge (Brown 1994, 151). His limited knowledge had been enriched through his experience. The growth of his knowledge provides a basis for the tensional progress in the epistemology of concrete others. On the other hand, "true human" means that Jesus was a perfect human being. Jesus was like us except without sin. Jesus was a perfect form of humanity. That is to say, Jesus was perfect human as well as perfect God. In this vein, the two-nature Christology provides a perfection of the dialectic relationship. The two-nature Christology provides a basis for the epistemology of concrete others as process as well as perfection. As is shown in the perfect hypostatic union of divinity and humanity, the dialectic process of solidarity of others has its goal: the perfection of the solidarity of others.

5. Conclusion

I have proposed an epistemology of concrete others as a foundation for solidarity of others, which is to protect the vulnerable who are experiencing economic, political, and cultural exploitation in a globalizing world. The vulnerable are exposed to two kinds of violence: one is violence from the absolutization of otherness, transcendence, difference; the other is from the absolutization of solidarity, immanence, or homogeneity. While the absolutization of solidarity justifies oppression of others, the absolutization of difference enervates resistance of the oppressed others. In order to resist against oppression and violence, the oppressed others need to have solidarity of others. To work toward solidarity of others, one should sublate both the absolutization of solidarity and the absolutization of otherness, since absolutization of each has justified injustice, indifference, and oppression. Sublation of both the absolutization of solidarity (an epistemology of homogeneity) and the absolutization of otherness (an epistemology of difference) leads to a dialectic epistemology: an epistemology of concrete others. An epistemology of concrete others is based on the two-nature Christology which confirms hypostatic union between humanity and divinity, transcendence and immanence and particularity and universality. An epistemology of concrete others emphasizes both otherness and homogeneity, transcendence and immanence, and difference and commonness. An epistemology of concrete others necessitates and suffices for solidarity of others, with which the vulnerable can resist against oppression and indifference caused by absolutization of solidarity and difference, respectively.

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